

DRAFT

November 6, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday, you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to "all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use." You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second that in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically "jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons," as "an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas." Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled "Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba" specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba. I cannot believe that there could have been any doubt in your mind that B-52's, capable of carrying nuclear weapons were included.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representatives in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion.

In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, although I doubt that there could be any, I wish to comment upon a further point in your letter. You state that I gave assurances "that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the United States but by other countries of the Western Hemisphere either." The position is, of course, as stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh, that under the conditions stated we would agree "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." There is, of course, a clear implication that the United States would use its influence with the other countries of this Hemisphere and this is indeed so. If the conditions stated in my letter of October twenty-seventh are fully

carried out I continue to believe that the other countries of the Western Hemisphere will support the position I took. I must tell you, in all frankness, however, that these are sovereign countries and that their willingness to give assurances will be affected by the extent to which they consider that Cuba will in fact cease to be a threat to their security. I suggest that you take this into account in deciding upon your relationship with the Cuban Government in the military field. In this connection, I assume that your Government takes its assurances on submarine bases as seriously as we do. Our agreement related to assurances against invasion. But you must be aware that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this Hemisphere unless it ceases to allow its territory to be used militarily by an extra-hemispheric foreign power and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. Although these considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, I hope that you will give them due consideration.

**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

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